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Jeffrey O'Connell and Robert Joost have proposed an automobile
insurance scheme in which consumers freely choose between fault
and no-fault plans.'
Why not allow individual motorists to select the kind of insurance they
want? Why not let the consumer decide?
. . . Individual motorists should have the same right to choose, in a free-
enterprise economy, whether they want traditional or no-fault protection, as
they now have to choose whether they want an automatic or a manual
transmission in their automobile. Allowing individual choice between insur-
ance systems would satisfy motorists who prefer the traditional liability sys-
tem as well as those who believe that no-fault offers a superior method of
claims resolution .
In addition to increasing the consumers' alternatives, a system providing
individual choice would allow the no-fault and traditional systems to com-
pete in the marketplace.2
The idea of choice is very appealing, especially to economists.
However there are important situations where free choice is inappro-
priate. This paper will examine these situations and argue that free
choice of liability rules and insurance regimes will be socially harm-
ful. Section I examines the case where free choice for economic
agents is the preferable system. Section II examines why a regime of
free choice is not applicable to the choice of liability rules and insur-
ance regimes. In this section it is shown that the choice between
fault and no-fault insurance is not, as O'Connell and Joost argue, the
* Professor of Economics, University of Toronto. B. Com. 1965, University of To-
ronto; M.A. 1968, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1971, University of Chicago.
1. See O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-
Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61 (1986).
2. Id. at 76.
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same as the choice between manual and automatic transmissions.
The key difference is the phenomenon of externalities. In Section III,
the conclusions are presented.
I. THE SUPERIORITY OF FREE CHOICE IN THE ABSENCE OF
EXTERNALITIES
In general, economists prefer a system where economic agents are
free to choose the goods and services they purchase. The reason is
economists assume individual agents know their tastes and prefer-
ences better than anyone else. Hence, when individuals are free to
choose, they choose the bundle of goods which will lead to maximum
satisfaction. Consider the example of consumers being able to choose
between manual and automatic transmissions given by O'Connell
and Joost. An alternative system would be one in which the govern-
ment decides that automatic transmissions are superior and man-
dates that only automatic transmissions be produced. In that situa-
tion, consumers are clearly worse off because choice does not exist in
the marketplace.
In the above example, free choice is the optimal policy. What is
crucial about that example is the lack of externalities. In the case of
choosing automobile transmissions, an individual consumer's choice
of an automatic or manual transmission does not impose costs on
other consumers. Economists would describe this situation as one in
which there are no third party effects (or no externalities). In the
vast majority of consumer decisionmaking situations there are no ex-
ternalities. That is why our general intuition leads us to favor
schemes allowing maximum choice.
However where externalities do exist, the costs imposed on third
parties must be considered. In such a world, free choice does not
lead to the maximum welfare of economic agents.
II. WHY FREE CHOICE IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE SELECTION OF
INSURANCE REGIMES
When a consumer chooses between fault and no-fault auto insur-
ance there are external effects on other consumers. These external
effects must be considered in any choice scheme. There are basically
two distinct externalities which are important in the choice between
fault and no-fault. It is important to note that a choice of no-fault is
not merely a choice of first party insurance over third party insur-
ance. No-fault also involves a major change in the liability rules ap-
plied to automobile accidents.3 One externality in the choice system
3. The extent of change in liability rules depends on the handling of the insurance
companies' subrogation rights. For purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that no
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comes from the change in liability rules; another externality is due to
the operation of an insurance market with a choice between first and
third party insurance. Let us examine each of these externalities.
A. The Need for a Universally Applied Liability Rule
When a negligent automobile driver has an accident and injures
another automobile driver, the negligent driver has imposed costs on
innocent third parties. In other words, automobile accidents impose
external costs. Under current fault based systems, negligent drivers
are legally responsible for the harm imposed on innocent accident
victims. Under a no-fault system, negligent drivers are relieved of
responsibility for those external costs imposed on innocent third
parties.
A choice between fault and no-fault allows individual economic
agents a choice of whether they will be responsible for their negli-
gent actions or whether they will be relieved of this responsibility.'
Clearly, those agents most likely to act negligently will choose not to
be liable for their actions (they will choose no-fault). This elimina-
tion of liability will reduce the standard of care taken by some driv-
ers and will result in increased accident rates. This clearly is not a
socially optimal situation. It is because of these externalities that
O'Connell and Joost are incorrect to think "[i]ndividual motorists
should have the same right to choose ...whether they want tradi-
tional or no-fault protection, as they now have to choose whether
they want an automatic or a manual transmission in their automo-
bile."5 O'Connell and Joost fail to realize that choice of liability
rules is not the same type of choice as choice of transmissions. Can it
ever make sense to allow individuals to choose the liability rules ap-
plicable to them? The answer is a resounding no. No legal system
subrogation rights exist. One could have a choice system with a variety of subrogation
rights.
4. Professor Brown argues that allowing people to choose liability rules in effect
allows individuals to buy immunity from a suit, much like liability insurance protects
individuals from risk of a suit. He then implies that if one does not object to liability
insurance one should not object to choice no-fault systems. This argument confuses elimi-
nation of responsibility for an action with insuring against such a risk. What no-fault
does is completely eliminate financial responsibility for the harm negligent drivers impose
on innocent accident victims. There is no objection under our current system to individu-
als insuring against certain contingencies. In such a world, high risk individuals face
appropriate premiums and still have the correct incentives to take due care. This is not
the case under no-fault. Brown, A Choice of Choice: Adding Postaccident Choice to the
Menu of No-Fault Models, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1095 (1989).
5. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 76.
1089
can let individuals choose the legal rule under which they will oper-
ate. There is a need for one rule of law which will apply to all mem-
bers of society.
If choice is the superior option, would O'Connell and Joost con-
sider allowing their choice model of liability to be applied to the
harm caused by polluters? Can we let polluters decide whether they
will be responsible for the harm they impose on others? Free choice
between a fault or a no-fault system in this situation does exactly
that. Those companies who will do more damage to others than
others will do to them will choose a no-fault system. Such free choice
will lead to too much pollution, to damage to our environment, and
ultimately, to a lower level of economic well-being. Would O'Connell
and Joost extend their choice system to the criminal law? Would we
ever give criminals the choice of whether they will be liable for their
criminal acts? Clearly, where the actions of some members of society
impose costs on other members, free choice of liability regimes are
completely inappropriate.
When externalities are present (as they are in the case of automo-
bile accidents), the state must decide on the legal rules which apply
to everyone and lead to a socially optimal situation. The state should
adopt a legal rule which minimizes the costs of accidents plus the
costs of accident avoidance (such a legal rule would be economically
efficient). Hence, the question becomes not one of choice but one of
which regime, fault or no-fault, leads to lower overall costs of acci-
dents. From a theoretical point of view, the standard of care ob-
served by drivers is reduced when they are no longer responsible for
the harm they do to others. In addition, the no-fault option, with its
lower premiums for high risk drivers, may allow high risk drivers on
the road who, under a fault system, would have been priced out of
the market. A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that
jurisdictions which have implemented no-fault car insurance have
experienced generally increased accident rates, involving increases in
property damage, increases in personal injuries, and increases in
death. The strongest evidence comes from Quebec. Professor Gaudry
found the implementation of no-fault in that province resulted in an
eleven percent increase in accidents with property damage only, a
27.7 % increase in accidents with at least one injury, and a 6.8 %
increase in fatalities.6 Another study of the Quebec situation was re-
cently completed by Professor Rose Anne Devlin.7 In contrast to the
Gaudry study, the Devlin study better separates the pure no-fault
6. Gaudry, Un Modble de la Demande Routi~re des Accidents et leur GravitW
applique au Quebec de 1956 b 1982, CAHIER No. 8432 (Universit6 de Montr6al 1984).
7. R. Devlin, Liability versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Anal-
ysis of the Experience in Quebec (Oct. 1988) (Ph.D. thesis) (available in the University
of Toronto library).
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effects of the Quebec scheme from the particular pricing scheme
which was adopted in Quebec. Professor Devlin concluded that "the
care taken by drivers is shown to have decreased significantly after
no-fault, resulting, for instance in a 9.62% increase in fatal acci-
dents. The conclusion reached ,is the liability system in the presence
of liability insurance does indeed deter accidents." 8
R.I. McEwin recently completed a study of the introduction of no-
fault insurance in the Northern Territories of Australia and in New
Zealand." The study concluded that "the abolition of the common-
law tort of negligence action was associated with a sixteen per cent
increase in the number of road fatalities per head of popula-
tion. . . . The results should concern those who discount the role a
negligence liability rule plays in promoting safety."'10
B. The Adverse Selection Problem
There is another externality involved in the pricing of fault and
no-fault insurance policies in a choice regime." In a choice system,
the fault plan will better be able to identify high risk drivers than
the no-fault plan. This is because the fault plan records payouts of
accidents where the insured is negligent while the no-fault plan sim-
ply records payouts involving accidents in which the insured driver
makes a claim. Under the fault system substantial resources are de-
voted to finding fault. Under no-fault plans there is no need to
devote resources to finding fault since payouts are independent of
fault. As a consequence, high risk drivers will be charged higher pre-
miums under the fault plan and therefore will tend to select a no-
fault option. These high risk drivers will enter the no-fault insurance
pool and eventually cause average premiums in this pool to increase.
In this way, high risk drivers impose external costs on the existing
8. Id. Professor Devlin also concluded:
[T]he total social cost of the increase in accidents arising from the switch to
public no-fault insurance in Quebec using conservative estimates is 259.6 mil-
lion (1981 dollars) per year. The social benefits resulting from administration
cost savings is $39.21 to $94.10 million. Thus there is clearly a net social loss
of $220.39 to $165.5 million dollars per year.
Id. at 263.
9. McEwin, No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australian Evidence, 9 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1989).
10. Id. at 17.
11. For a discussion of this externality, see G. Priest, Allowing Drivers a Choice
Between No-Fault and Fault-Based Auto Insurance: An Analytical Critique (Nov. 1988)
(copies available from author).
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low risk drivers.' 2 This is the nature of the externality and the ad-
verse selection problem.
There is another aspect to this adverse selection problem. When-
ever possible, drivers who have chosen the no-fault option will have
incentives to make claims against private or public health insurers
rather than against the no-fault carrier (since claims against the no-
fault carrier would result in premium increases).
Consider the example of an injured driver requiring both physical
and psychological rehabilitation services and whose accident oc-
curred in Ontario where there is public health insurance. Currently,
patients in Ontario in need of rehabilitation services have the option
of using Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan (OHIP) covered physi-
otherapists and psychiatrists or non-OHIP covered private physio-
therapy clinics or psychologists. The reason private services can co-
exist in the marketplace with "free" OHIP services is there are
substantial waiting lists for the OHIP provided services. Under a
"fault" system, innocent accident victims will utilize the more read-
ily available private rehabilitation services which will be charged to
the third party insurer. Under a no-fault system, accident victims
have an incentive to utilize OHIP services. This has a number of
undesirable effects. It will increase the demand on the already
overburdened OHIP system, therefore increasing the costs of run-
ning the system.
In addition, waiting periods for rehabilitation services will in-
crease. These greater waiting periods may substantially decrease the
effectiveness of rehabilitation programs. As Judge Osborne noted in
his inquiry, "[a]ll submissions relating to rehabilitation suggested
that rehabilitation must be undertaken at an optimum time (usually
early) to be most effective."' 13
Hence, if the no-fault option hinders early intervention, it will
probably result in greater levels of disability and greater drains on
already overtaxed OHIP funded medical and hospital facilities. This
will increase the costs to first party insurance carriers (resulting in
higher premiums) and certainly will increase the social cost of
accidents.
The externalities caused by adverse selection will make pricing
fault and no-fault options extremely difficult and will make admini-
stration of these plans very cumbersome. It should be noted that ju-
risdictions having rate regulation would find administration of the
12. In addition, to the extent the pool of no-fault drivers is, on the average, higher
risk, no-fault drivers will be responsible for more connector accidents than fault drivers.
This will result in fault drivers subsidizing no-fault drivers because of the pricing of
connector coverage.
13. C. OSBORNE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COI-
PENSATION IN ONTARIO 162 (1988).
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choice plan especially cumbersome. In Ontario, which has rate regu-
lation, rate hearings before the Ontario Automobile Insurance Board
would be required for both the fault option and the no-fault option.
The Board would have to engage in the almost impossible task of
allocating insurance company costs between these two types of insur-
ance policies. Under regulation, the insurance industry could price
the fault option so high no consumer would freely choose it. Any
insurance company desiring to charge a lower rate for the fault op-
tion than the industry set rate would need specific Board approval.14
If the fault option is priced out of the market, this action would con-
vert a de jure choice system into a de facto pure no-fault system.
Finally, it should be noted that with consumers switching from one
insurance pool to another, and insurance companies accordingly al-
tering premiums, the insurance cycle may be made much worse than
it is already.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In situations where there are no externalities, giving consumers
choice unambiguously improves welfare. However, in the case of au-
tomobile accidents, there are substantial externalities. In such a situ-
ation, it makes no sense to allow economic agents to choose the lia-
bility rule under which they operate. One cannot allow negligent
drivers to decide whether or not they will be liable for the harm they
cause to others. One cannot allow drunk drivers the option of being
relieved of the responsibility for the harm they cause to others.
A choice system will cause high risk drivers to choose the no-fault
plan. This choice cannot be considered socially optimal since high
risk drivers will then impose costs on low risk drivers. This adverse
selection problem will force good drivers to subsidize bad drivers,
will make pricing of fault and no-fault plans very difficult, and will
make administration of these plans very cumbersome. The interac-
tions of a choice system with rate regulation will create a system
which will be extremely difficult and costly to administer.
A choice system will result in a greater utilization of the already
overburdened health insurance system. This may cause increased
waiting periods for rehabilitation services for innocent accident vic-
tims resulting in decreased effectiveness of rehabilitation programs.
14. To charge a rate outside the range set by the Board, the insurer must demon-
strate that the proposed rate is just and reasonable and not excessive or inadequate and
that the circumstances facing the insurer justify the use of the proposed rate. Presenting
dne's case before the Board may be very costly for individual insurance companies.
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If this is the case, the social costs of accidents will increase.
When externalities are present, as is always the case in automobile
accidents, choice makes no sense. The real question is the desirabil-
ity of fault versus the desirability of no-fault. A system which frees
economic agents from liability for the harm they impose on others
results in a reduction in the driving standard of care. Two recently
completed studies confirm earlier empirical results that adoption of
no-fault insurance results in a substantial increase in automobile ac-
cident fatalities. For these reasons, as well as others, Judge Osborne
rejected the no-fault option. "Threshold no fault should be rejected
because it is relatively inefficient and unnecessarily arbitrary. ...
Pure no fault should be rejected on fairness and deterrence grounds
and because it is manifest that few seem to want it."' 5 It should be
noted that under our current system of negligence laws, traditional
fault systems do offer consumers choices. They do not offer consum-
ers a choice of liability regimes under which to operate but they do
offer individuals a choice of protection against losses from accidents.
Automobile drivers already have the choice of health insurance cov-
erage to protect against medical expenses arising from accidents.
Automobile drivers can purchase accident and disability insurance to
protect themselves against loss of income in the case of accidents in
which they are the negligent party.
15. C. OSBORNE, supra note 13, at 45.
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